Strategy of Hamas--the following short-term?

On Friday, June 15, 2007, Hamas triumphantly proclaimed its victory in the Gaza Strip. ''We are telling our people that the past era has ended and will not return," Hamas spokesman Islam Shahwan declared. With the Gaza Strip now under the rule of Hamas, the issue arises as to whether Hamas will be able to rapidly transform its Gaza victory into sweeping gains for its movement beyond the boundaries of that area. Odds are much against such an outcome in the near-term.

Hamas is not in a strong position to "break out" of the international embargo arrayed against it. It currently lacks both widespread global legitimacy and the military capacity to intensify its "war" against Israel. It has gained the Gaza Strip, but at the risk of losing its influence over the future evolution of the larger Palestinian issue. Consequently, it will seek to consolidate its position in the Gaza Strip, pursue a gradual "bottom-up" approach toward Islamic rule in the Gaza Strip, undermine the new Palestinian government in the West Bank, and ease outside pressure on its organization.

At present, Hamas is too weak to inflict substantial harm on Israel, much less pose an existential threat to that country. In addition, fresh from its indecisive outcome in Lebanon, Israel would almost certainly err on the side of overestimating the amount of force necessary to prevail in the Gaza Strip, so as to avoid another outcome that could fatally imperil its doctrine of deterrence in a regional "neighborhood" that is growing increasingly tougher with Iran's rising power and spreading instability. Hamas also understands that Israel largely succeeded in suppressing the intifada of suicide bomb attacks from the measures and tactics Israel implemented against the terrorists. Hence it is very unlikely that Hamas will risk "overplaying" its hand against Israel in the near-term, even if Iran tries to tempt it in that direction. Instead, Hamas will likely continue to launch periodic rocket attacks and other small-scale terrorist activity against Israel to demonstrate that it maintains its fight against Israel. However, it likely will not dramatically increase the magnitude or frequency of such attacks to the extent that it would provoke a major Israeli military response. In addition, it could well renew its conditional offers for a ceasefire with Israel to try to "buy time" to strengthen its hold over the Gaza Strip, especially if Fatah and/or the international community strengthen their efforts to isolate Hamas.

These realities will likely constrain Hamas through the near- and, possibly, the medium-term, as well. As a result, Hamas is likely to pursue a limited agenda. That agenda will be comprised of four major elements:

o Consolidating of its Rule in the Gaza Strip: Hamas will seek to solidify its hold over the Gaza Strip. This will entail such measures as placing all major armed groups under its authority, enticing opponents to join its cause through offers of amnesty and perhaps political patronage, and suppressing, sometimes violently, those who maintain their opposition. Even as it tries to strengthen its rule over the Gaza Strip, Hamas will attempt to downplay the Gaza Strip's separation from the West Bank so as to maintain is posture of supporting a single Arab state over the entire Palestine region. Hence, it will continue to assert its willingness to cooperate with the West Bank and express a desire to enter into a dialogue with Fatah. Hamas also needs relative calm with Israel to consolidate its grip over the Gaza Strip. Toward that end, Hamas may renew its offer of a ceasefire with Israel, but the terms of such an offer would fall far short of a path that would lead toward Hamas' recognition of Israel or a more permanent peace. Hamas will not likely abandon its objective of seeking to eliminate Israel in the future.

o Incremental Islamization: Hamas seeks to create a single Islamic state in the historic Palestine region. At present, it likely lacks the ability to impose such a state in the Gaza Strip through decree. At the same time, it desires to present itself to the world as a "moderate" force, and the imposition of Islamic rule would undermine that effort. As a result, Hamas will likely seek to build an Islamic state from the "bottom up." Education would constitute a logical starting point for such an effort. Hamas has emphasized the control of education for pursuing its objectives. The Hamas Charter states, "It is necessary that scientists, educators and teachers, information and media people, as well as the educated masses, especially the youth and sheikhs of the Islamic movements, should take part in the operation of awakening (the masses)... It is necessary to follow Islamic orientation in educating the Islamic generations in our region by teaching the religious duties, comprehensive study of the Koran, the study of the Prophet's Sunna (his sayings and doings), and learning about Islamic history and heritage from their authentic sources." The Turkish Daily News recently reported, "During a year in power, the Islamic Hamas movement has begun taking control of Palestinian schools and is making changes... In some cases, girls are pushed by pro-Hamas teachers to pray and wear headscarves, although no law requires it." That trend will likely continue.

o Undermining the Legitimacy of the New Palestinian Government: Hamas will likely attempt to delegitimize the new West Bank-based Palestinian government headed by President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. To do so, Hamas will assert that this new government is both unconstitutional and undemocratic. Any diplomacy by President Abbas or Prime Minister Fayyad with Israel, the United States, or other members of the international community will likely be dismissed as "collusion."

o Impairing the Performance of the New Palestinian Government: Hamas has a presence in the West Bank, albeit a smaller one than in the Gaza Strip. It will likely attempt to thwart the new Palestinian government's ability to function via terrorist attacks or assassinations aimed at intimidating the new government's personnel, undermining the possibility of Israel's loosening security restrictions, and blocking the new Palestinian government's ability to proceed along the diplomatic path. If Hamas can render the new Palestinian government ineffective, economic growth and improved standards of living would remain elusive in the West Bank. If Hamas can pin down the new Palestinian government with violence in the West Bank, it can limit that government's ability to regain control over the Gaza Strip. If Hamas can prevent Israel from loosening security restrictions in the West Bank, prospects for the West Bank's ability to evolve toward a free and stable state would be reduced. If Hamas can prevent the new Palestinian leadership from making diplomatic progress with Israel, then the historic Palestinian-Israeli dispute would be perpetuated. Such outcomes would lead to an erosion of popular support for the new Palestinian government and would put Hamas in a position to "wait out" its tenure.

Hamas' bid to delegitimize the new Palestinian government is likely to pose the most serious early threat, so a closer look at its arguments is in order. In advancing its claim, Hamas will likely argue that President Abbas exceeded his constitutional authority in firing Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas and appointing a new Prime Minister. A careful reading of the Palestinian Basic Law or Constitution reveals that this is a weak case even if the rhetoric is impressive.

Article 45 of the Palestinian Constitution grants the President authority to fire the Prime Minister. Article 43 gives the President the ability to issue binding decrees in "exceptional cases" when the legislature is not in session. President Abbas used such authority to fire Prime Minister Haniyeh and appoint Salam Fayyad as his replacement.

The more treacherous part may come later. President Abbas' decrees have force of law so long as the Palestinian legislature is not in session. However, once the legislature is convened, those decrees must be presented to the legislature for approval and, if not presented or approved, they lose power of authority. Hamas holds a majority in the legislature. Nonetheless, such a majority does not present an insurmountable problem.

Under Article 74 of the Constitution, Hamas could attempt to convene the legislature to overturn Abbas' decrees (particularly those that have outlawed its armed wing) and attempt to remove or rein in Prime Minister Fayyad. With Israel having previously detained a number of Hamas legislators and Fatah having abandoned the legislature, it is uncertain whether Hamas could put together a quorum so as to convene the legislature.

Even if Hamas were to find a quorum, Article 77 requires an absolute majority of the legislature to topple the government via a no confidence. It is not possible at this time for Hamas to forge an absolute majority of legislators.

Even in the unlikely event that Hamas were able to muster an absolute majority, it would not be able to impose its will through the legislature. Article 86 of the Constitution requires that the "conditions" of employment of all appointed public officials and staff be "in accordance to the law." While the legislators were elected, as opposed to appointed, it is general practice in democratic societies to hold all members of government accountable under the law. Hence, President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad could cite Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip as having put that organization and its members in violation of the law, which would render their legislative role irrelevant.

This will leave Hamas to try to portray the Abbas-Fayyad government as violating the democratic will of the Palestinian people. Hamas will argue that its members were elected as a majority and, therefore, Abbas and Fayyad have taken steps that run counter to the will of the Palestinian majority. Abbas and Fayyad can counter that while Hamas' representatives had been elected to serve the Palestinian public, they did not receive a popular mandate to seize the Gaza Strip in an armed operation. At the same time, given Hamas' armed control of the Gaza Strip, Abbas and Fayyad could successfully argue that the situation there is not conducive for free and fair elections.

In the end, on account of a combination of its relative weakness, the heavy demands associated with governing a poverty-stricken and dysfunctional territory, a continuing international economic embargo on the Gaza Strip even as the West Bank is poised to receive financial and technical assistance from around the world, and possible diplomatic moves by Israel and the international community to advance the peace process with the West Bank's more pragmatic leadership, Hamas will likely try to delegitimize the Palestinian government headed by President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. At the same time, it could increasingly seek to return to a situation that would resemble the status quo ante Hamas shattered with its seizure of the Gaza Strip. Such moves would be designed solely to ease the pressure on Hamas that resulted from that development that, if not mitigated, could reverse its gains in the Gaza Strip and undercut its ability to pursue its longer-term objectives. Those tactics, regardless of how they are positioned, are not likely to represent a moderation of Hamas' radical ideology and aims. Hamas' long-term goal will very likely remain Israel's elimination, even if Hamas attempts to enter into a temporary ceasefire or de facto relationship with Israel in the near-term to facilitate its position in the Gaza Strip.

Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.

Near-Term Prospects for a Lebanon-Israel Peace Treaty

On Sunday, August 20, 2006, Lebanon's Prime Minister Fouad Siniora suggested that Israel, if it 'behaves wisely,' could be in a position to enter into a peace treaty with Lebanon. Don't schedule the celebrations just yet. Throughout the course of its long history, the Middle East has been a graveyard for optimism. There, the promise of peace has typically proved more illusory than a desert mirage. Therefore, the offer needs to be tested to determine if it is credible. Even if it is, major obstacles could still block the way to peace between Lebanon and Israel.

Prime Minister Siniora's willingness to pursue peace with Israel could be ascertained by determining whether he is willing to engage in direct and unconditional negotiations with Israel aimed at reaching a bilateral peace treaty. Israel should test the Prime Minister's commitment to peace by inviting him to Jerusalem for such talks. Afterward, rhetoric would have to give way to diplomacy.

If the Lebanese Prime Minister is serious about peace, the path to peace between Israel and Lebanon is relatively uncomplicated in terms of the substance involved. An agreement would declare that the historic conflict between Israel and Lebanon is "finally terminated," provide for full diplomatic relations between the two countries, resolve the status of the disputed Shebaa Farms area in creating a secure, recognized, and agreed border, provide for the disarming of Hezbollah and offer assurances that both parties would take responsibility to prevent attacks against the other from being launched from their soil, and would end any economic boycotts.

Nonetheless, uncomplicated as the path to peace might be, a host of obstacles would likely make the peace process perilous. A glimpse at those possible barriers is useful in assessing the near- or medium-term prospect for a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel.

The Historic Arab Narrative:

The historic Arab narrative that sees Israel as an "artificial" and "illegitimate" state could color attitudes against a bilateral peace agreement. The bias could be tilted severely toward a prolonged ceasefire that falls far short of peace and full diplomatic relations.

In 1977, former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban explained, "...history is the enemy of the Arab-Israeli reconciliation. The past is the adversary of the future. The vision that Arabs deduce form their history has never included the idea of a Jewish sovereignty in the heart of the Middle East..." Such attitudes can be overcome to the extent that a bilateral peace treaty becomes possible, as they were in Egypt and Jordan. However, in a weak state with a weak government, not to mention a fairly large share of the population that is radicalized, the effort could prove much more daunting.

Lebanon's Internal Dynamics:

Lebanon rests on a fragile, often uneasy, balance between diverse religious groups. The religious balance continues to shift toward an increasing Muslim majority and a shrinking Christian minority. Muslims include Shia, Sunnis, and Druze. Christians include Maronites, Roman Catholics, and Greek Orthodox. As a result of its diverse population, the Library of Congress' Country Study on Lebanon explains, "sectarianism (or confessionalism) is the dominant social, economic, and political reality. Divisiveness has come to define that which is Lebanon... While Muslims and Christians have lived together in Lebanon for over a century, their deep disagreements over the Lebanese political formula and state make it unrealistic to treat all Lebanese as members of one social unit... Lebanon's somewhat peculiar political system has reinforced sectarian identification and consciousness." The report adds, "Each sect has its own set of personal status laws... The confessional system of personal-status laws strengthens the role of communal religious leaders and impedes the evolution of Lebanese nationalist or universalist secular ideas."

These dynamics translate into a weak government that might not be able to gain sufficient public support to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. With the Shia population, radicalized by longstanding support from Syria and Iran, now comprising up to 45% of Lebanon's population, popular sentiment in Lebanon is likely to run against a peace treaty. The Christians alone could not conclude such an agreement without the risk of a fresh civil war.

At the same time, Lebanon's internal dynamics also provide an ideal environment in which "state within a state" entities can flourish. In the 1970s, Palestinian terrorist groups enjoyed a large degree of autonomy and used Lebanon as a staging ground for cross-border terrorist attacks against Israel. From the late 1980s to the present, Hezbollah has dominated south Lebanon and launched terrorist attacks against Israel from there. Fresh from what it perceives to have been a "victory" on account of the inconclusive outcome from the recent combat between Israel and Hezbollah, Hezbollah is not likely to be very keen on efforts to bring about a bilateral Lebanon-Israel peace accord. Furthermore, even if Hezbollah could be persuaded by Lebanon's Government to accept such a peace treaty, breakaway factions or newly-formed radical groups would likely have the ability to supplant Hezbollah in the absence of broad-based communal support for bilateral peace.

Regional Geopolitics:

Lebanon is likely to remain an important piece of a growing geopolitical struggle between the Middle East's forces of "Rejectionism" and "Moderation." Such a battle could put further strains on Lebanon's weak government and divisive society.

Iran and Syria will continue to spearhead the Rejectionist element. Both have substantial influence with regard to Hezbollah. Syria still sees Lebanon as a historic part of "Greater Syria" and is vying to keep Lebanon within its sphere of influence. Syria could well attempt to use Lebanon as a bargaining chip for pursuing its own demands with Israel and avoiding increased diplomatic isolation. A bilateral Lebanon-Israel peace agreement would shrink the pool of the Middle East's "confrontation states" and weaken Syrian regional influence. An erosion of Syrian influence could exacerbate internal pressures for reform within Syria.

Iran sees Lebanon's Shia population as a natural base for expanding its Islamic Revolution and building a de facto Shia Caliphate that includes Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, not to mention incorporating Shia populations spread across other Middle Eastern states and beyond. Moreover, its role is not incompatible with Syria's political realities, as the Shia and minority Alawites have long cooperated against the Sunnis in Syria and Syria has aligned itself with Iran since 1980.

So long as Syria is positioned to exert significant influence in Lebanon and the Shia remain steadfast partners in helping perpetuate the Alawite Ba'athist government in Damascus--and Iran could accommodate Syria toward those ends--Syria likely will not resist a de facto Caliphate. With Iraq being pulled in the direction of Iran despite the presence of more than 100,000 American soldiers there, the regional balance of power is beginning to tilt more toward Iran and away from the United States and West. That trend will tend to further deepen Iranian-Syrian cooperation.

At a minimum, the Rejectionist group is likely to try to harden any tough negotiating positions that might be adopted by Lebanon. Following Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) launched a diplomatic offensive in the Arab world aimed at blocking the possibility of a separate peace between Egypt and Israel. Later, at a sensitive moment in the early stages of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, Morocco's King Hassan praised Sadat's "firmness" against what he described as "Israeli pretentions."

If that does not impede progress, terrorists could instigate a major terrorist attack or series of attacks to sabotage the peace process. In March 1978, the PLO seized a bus in Israel and killed 32 Israelis on the eve of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's trip to the United States to further the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. If such attacks do little to abort the peace process, a campaign of assassinations and car bombings directed at Lebanese leaders could be undertaken, much as occurred during the early 1980s. Moreover, Lebanon's Shia could be encouraged by Iran to seek a new governing relationship based on current demographic realities. Such a bid could shatter Lebanon's delicate political structure and bring an end to any peace process that might be underway.

Radical Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both of whose leaders are hosted by Damascus, could seek to foment unrest among Lebanon's Palestinian population. Lebanon's political leaders remain opposed to granting Palestinians full rights of citizenship, even those born in Lebanon. They fear that such an arrangement would upset the current sectarian balance upon which Lebanon's political and economic system rests. Hence, even if Lebanon embraces a long-term goal for the resettlement of Palestinians in a Palestinian state, radical Palestinian leaders could still provoke such unrest to help block a possible peace treaty.

Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are likely to head up the Moderate camp. In no small part on account of those three states, the Arab League is already attempting to counter the money Iran is providing to Hezbollah for Lebanon's reconstruction. "This is a war over the hearts and mind of the Lebanese, which Arabs should not lose to the Iranians this time," a senior Arab League official explained. Concern over Iranian hegemony could tend to erode the longstanding Arab historical narrative, particularly as the Moderate effort is led by two countries that have entered into peace treaties with Israel.

Negotiating Obstacles:

The biggest danger of a breakdown in negotiations would come from an attempt by Lebanon to link a peace agreement to overall Middle East peace. With Syrian and Palestinian demands likely irreconcilable for the time being, such linkage could only preclude a bilateral peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel. Syria would seek to bring the Golan Heights into the calculus while radical Palestinian groups would seek a "right of return" of all Palestinian refugees and their descendants to Israel. Both would greatly complicate the diplomatic calculus and the latter demand would be a "deal breaker."

In addition to linkage, Lebanon could seek the fulfillment of prior conditions before proceeding with possible peace talks. Lebanon could seek that Israel turn over a portion of the disputed Shebaa Farms area to Lebanon as a gesture of good faith. It could seek that Israel turn over control of that area to the United Nations in advance. Early in the Egyptian-Israeli talks, Egypt demanded a guarantee that Israel would commit in advance to turning over all of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Later, Egypt requested that Israel demonstrate its commitment to peace by turning over the West Bank to Jordan and Gaza Strip to Egypt before any agreement was reached. Afterward, Egypt sought a transfer of the town of El Arish as a "good faith" gesture. Historically, such gestures have gone unrewarded in the Middle East. Most recently, Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 did little to mitigate terrorist attacks launched from there.

In response to Sadat's demands, Begin replied, "Nobody can get anything for nothing." At the time, Prime Minister Begin's seeming "intransigence" was widely criticized from within and outside Israel. However, well before Sadat had made his dramatic trip to Israel, Israel had agreed to the principle of withdrawal, but the extent and implementation of such a withdrawal depended on the agreement to a peace accord, rather than anything less than a full peace e.g., a ceasefire or truce extension.

Ultimately, Egypt moderated its stance and dropped its demand for prior conditions. That development led to the successful Camp David Summit in 1978. The Summit led to a breakthrough agreement that paved the way to a bilateral peace agreement the following year.

Outlook for Lebanon-Israel Peace Treaty:

Given the above background information, odds appear to run strongly against the achievement of a bilateral Lebanon-Israel peace agreement in the near-term. Given the hazards of a weak Lebanese government, fragile sectarian balance coupled with Lebanon's changing demographics, regional geopolitical situation that is arguably tilting more toward Iran, and possible procedural pitfalls, the obstacles are probably too great to overcome, particularly within the next 3-5 years, if not longer. Neither Egypt nor Jordan faced such an array of barriers. Egypt was a strong state, was guided by a visionary risk-taking leader, and had the political capacity to break free of Arab Rejectionism. Jordan's King Hussein had enjoyed a long period of behind-the-scenes cooperation with Israel and a strong relationship with the United States, and those factors coupled with Egypt's previously breaking the taboo of recognizing Israel, greatly reduced the risks of his formalizing peace with Israel.

Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.