Strategy of Hamas--the following short-term?

On Friday, June 15, 2007, Hamas triumphantly proclaimed its victory in the Gaza Strip. ''We are telling our people that the past era has ended and will not return," Hamas spokesman Islam Shahwan declared. With the Gaza Strip now under the rule of Hamas, the issue arises as to whether Hamas will be able to rapidly transform its Gaza victory into sweeping gains for its movement beyond the boundaries of that area. Odds are much against such an outcome in the near-term.

Hamas is not in a strong position to "break out" of the international embargo arrayed against it. It currently lacks both widespread global legitimacy and the military capacity to intensify its "war" against Israel. It has gained the Gaza Strip, but at the risk of losing its influence over the future evolution of the larger Palestinian issue. Consequently, it will seek to consolidate its position in the Gaza Strip, pursue a gradual "bottom-up" approach toward Islamic rule in the Gaza Strip, undermine the new Palestinian government in the West Bank, and ease outside pressure on its organization.

At present, Hamas is too weak to inflict substantial harm on Israel, much less pose an existential threat to that country. In addition, fresh from its indecisive outcome in Lebanon, Israel would almost certainly err on the side of overestimating the amount of force necessary to prevail in the Gaza Strip, so as to avoid another outcome that could fatally imperil its doctrine of deterrence in a regional "neighborhood" that is growing increasingly tougher with Iran's rising power and spreading instability. Hamas also understands that Israel largely succeeded in suppressing the intifada of suicide bomb attacks from the measures and tactics Israel implemented against the terrorists. Hence it is very unlikely that Hamas will risk "overplaying" its hand against Israel in the near-term, even if Iran tries to tempt it in that direction. Instead, Hamas will likely continue to launch periodic rocket attacks and other small-scale terrorist activity against Israel to demonstrate that it maintains its fight against Israel. However, it likely will not dramatically increase the magnitude or frequency of such attacks to the extent that it would provoke a major Israeli military response. In addition, it could well renew its conditional offers for a ceasefire with Israel to try to "buy time" to strengthen its hold over the Gaza Strip, especially if Fatah and/or the international community strengthen their efforts to isolate Hamas.

These realities will likely constrain Hamas through the near- and, possibly, the medium-term, as well. As a result, Hamas is likely to pursue a limited agenda. That agenda will be comprised of four major elements:

o Consolidating of its Rule in the Gaza Strip: Hamas will seek to solidify its hold over the Gaza Strip. This will entail such measures as placing all major armed groups under its authority, enticing opponents to join its cause through offers of amnesty and perhaps political patronage, and suppressing, sometimes violently, those who maintain their opposition. Even as it tries to strengthen its rule over the Gaza Strip, Hamas will attempt to downplay the Gaza Strip's separation from the West Bank so as to maintain is posture of supporting a single Arab state over the entire Palestine region. Hence, it will continue to assert its willingness to cooperate with the West Bank and express a desire to enter into a dialogue with Fatah. Hamas also needs relative calm with Israel to consolidate its grip over the Gaza Strip. Toward that end, Hamas may renew its offer of a ceasefire with Israel, but the terms of such an offer would fall far short of a path that would lead toward Hamas' recognition of Israel or a more permanent peace. Hamas will not likely abandon its objective of seeking to eliminate Israel in the future.

o Incremental Islamization: Hamas seeks to create a single Islamic state in the historic Palestine region. At present, it likely lacks the ability to impose such a state in the Gaza Strip through decree. At the same time, it desires to present itself to the world as a "moderate" force, and the imposition of Islamic rule would undermine that effort. As a result, Hamas will likely seek to build an Islamic state from the "bottom up." Education would constitute a logical starting point for such an effort. Hamas has emphasized the control of education for pursuing its objectives. The Hamas Charter states, "It is necessary that scientists, educators and teachers, information and media people, as well as the educated masses, especially the youth and sheikhs of the Islamic movements, should take part in the operation of awakening (the masses)... It is necessary to follow Islamic orientation in educating the Islamic generations in our region by teaching the religious duties, comprehensive study of the Koran, the study of the Prophet's Sunna (his sayings and doings), and learning about Islamic history and heritage from their authentic sources." The Turkish Daily News recently reported, "During a year in power, the Islamic Hamas movement has begun taking control of Palestinian schools and is making changes... In some cases, girls are pushed by pro-Hamas teachers to pray and wear headscarves, although no law requires it." That trend will likely continue.

o Undermining the Legitimacy of the New Palestinian Government: Hamas will likely attempt to delegitimize the new West Bank-based Palestinian government headed by President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. To do so, Hamas will assert that this new government is both unconstitutional and undemocratic. Any diplomacy by President Abbas or Prime Minister Fayyad with Israel, the United States, or other members of the international community will likely be dismissed as "collusion."

o Impairing the Performance of the New Palestinian Government: Hamas has a presence in the West Bank, albeit a smaller one than in the Gaza Strip. It will likely attempt to thwart the new Palestinian government's ability to function via terrorist attacks or assassinations aimed at intimidating the new government's personnel, undermining the possibility of Israel's loosening security restrictions, and blocking the new Palestinian government's ability to proceed along the diplomatic path. If Hamas can render the new Palestinian government ineffective, economic growth and improved standards of living would remain elusive in the West Bank. If Hamas can pin down the new Palestinian government with violence in the West Bank, it can limit that government's ability to regain control over the Gaza Strip. If Hamas can prevent Israel from loosening security restrictions in the West Bank, prospects for the West Bank's ability to evolve toward a free and stable state would be reduced. If Hamas can prevent the new Palestinian leadership from making diplomatic progress with Israel, then the historic Palestinian-Israeli dispute would be perpetuated. Such outcomes would lead to an erosion of popular support for the new Palestinian government and would put Hamas in a position to "wait out" its tenure.

Hamas' bid to delegitimize the new Palestinian government is likely to pose the most serious early threat, so a closer look at its arguments is in order. In advancing its claim, Hamas will likely argue that President Abbas exceeded his constitutional authority in firing Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas and appointing a new Prime Minister. A careful reading of the Palestinian Basic Law or Constitution reveals that this is a weak case even if the rhetoric is impressive.

Article 45 of the Palestinian Constitution grants the President authority to fire the Prime Minister. Article 43 gives the President the ability to issue binding decrees in "exceptional cases" when the legislature is not in session. President Abbas used such authority to fire Prime Minister Haniyeh and appoint Salam Fayyad as his replacement.

The more treacherous part may come later. President Abbas' decrees have force of law so long as the Palestinian legislature is not in session. However, once the legislature is convened, those decrees must be presented to the legislature for approval and, if not presented or approved, they lose power of authority. Hamas holds a majority in the legislature. Nonetheless, such a majority does not present an insurmountable problem.

Under Article 74 of the Constitution, Hamas could attempt to convene the legislature to overturn Abbas' decrees (particularly those that have outlawed its armed wing) and attempt to remove or rein in Prime Minister Fayyad. With Israel having previously detained a number of Hamas legislators and Fatah having abandoned the legislature, it is uncertain whether Hamas could put together a quorum so as to convene the legislature.

Even if Hamas were to find a quorum, Article 77 requires an absolute majority of the legislature to topple the government via a no confidence. It is not possible at this time for Hamas to forge an absolute majority of legislators.

Even in the unlikely event that Hamas were able to muster an absolute majority, it would not be able to impose its will through the legislature. Article 86 of the Constitution requires that the "conditions" of employment of all appointed public officials and staff be "in accordance to the law." While the legislators were elected, as opposed to appointed, it is general practice in democratic societies to hold all members of government accountable under the law. Hence, President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad could cite Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip as having put that organization and its members in violation of the law, which would render their legislative role irrelevant.

This will leave Hamas to try to portray the Abbas-Fayyad government as violating the democratic will of the Palestinian people. Hamas will argue that its members were elected as a majority and, therefore, Abbas and Fayyad have taken steps that run counter to the will of the Palestinian majority. Abbas and Fayyad can counter that while Hamas' representatives had been elected to serve the Palestinian public, they did not receive a popular mandate to seize the Gaza Strip in an armed operation. At the same time, given Hamas' armed control of the Gaza Strip, Abbas and Fayyad could successfully argue that the situation there is not conducive for free and fair elections.

In the end, on account of a combination of its relative weakness, the heavy demands associated with governing a poverty-stricken and dysfunctional territory, a continuing international economic embargo on the Gaza Strip even as the West Bank is poised to receive financial and technical assistance from around the world, and possible diplomatic moves by Israel and the international community to advance the peace process with the West Bank's more pragmatic leadership, Hamas will likely try to delegitimize the Palestinian government headed by President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. At the same time, it could increasingly seek to return to a situation that would resemble the status quo ante Hamas shattered with its seizure of the Gaza Strip. Such moves would be designed solely to ease the pressure on Hamas that resulted from that development that, if not mitigated, could reverse its gains in the Gaza Strip and undercut its ability to pursue its longer-term objectives. Those tactics, regardless of how they are positioned, are not likely to represent a moderation of Hamas' radical ideology and aims. Hamas' long-term goal will very likely remain Israel's elimination, even if Hamas attempts to enter into a temporary ceasefire or de facto relationship with Israel in the near-term to facilitate its position in the Gaza Strip.

Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.

Hamas Did Not Recognize Israel in Agreeing on a Deal with Fatah

On Tuesday (June 27), Hamas and Fatah reached agreement over a document drafted by a number of Palestinian prisoners. This agreement raised the issue of whether Hamas has now met the International Community's terms for a resumption of assistance to the Palestinian Government. It has not.

In the wake of the January 2006 election that saw Hamas gain to majority position in the Palestinian Government, the Madrid Quartet (the UN, EU, United States and Russia) laid out three criteria by which that government would remain eligible for international assistance: recognition of Israel, respect for existing agreements, and diplomatic to renunciation of violence. These minimal conditions are vitally important if a meaningful peace process is to be possible. Recognition of Israel entails to willingness by Hamas to negotiate toward a two-state solution to the historic Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The willingness of Hamas to honor the obligations set forth in diplomatic agreements is essential if diplomacy is to be viable. To renunciation of violence is key to making diplomacy the sole channel by which the historic dispute is addressed.

Even as the specific language of the Fatah-Hamas agreement has not been published, the terms of the prisoners' document on which both parties reached consensus are public. Its terms fall far short of the criteria laid out by the International Community. It does not require Hamas to abandon its objective of seeking Israel's elimination, it does not bind the Hamas-led Palestinian Government to the terms of existing diplomatic agreements, and, rather than renouncing violence, reaffirms its legitimacy.

Article 1 of the prisoners' document contains a "poison pill" by which Israel would be compelled to commit demographic suicide. Article 1 declares that the Palestinian leadership will seek "to secure the right of return for the refugees." Article 9 provides additional language toward that end. By demanding that Israel admit all Palestinian refugees from the 1948 War and all their descendents, the overwhelming majority of whom were not born in Israel, Israel's demographics would be changed so as to render it a Jewish minority state. Afterward, Israel's democratic system could be employed by the new majority population to engineer Israel's demise and subsequent consolidation with a Palestinian state. The outcome would be Israel's disappearance from the map and the language concerning territories captured by Israel in the 1967 War would provide no protection whatsoever from this fate.

Article 3 of the prisoners' document proclaims to "right of the Palestinian people" to maintain an "option" for violence, even as it seeks to focus that violence on territories captured by Israel in 1967. That represents to dramatic rejection the Madrid Quartet's criteria that Hamas renounce violence and that concerning respect for existing diplomatic agreements.

The Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement of 1993 (the first "Oslo" agreement) declared, "The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian team representing the Palestinian people agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve to just"", lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process." The Oslo Agreement's "agreed political process" does not in any way, shape, or form grant permission for the Palestinians to undertake terrorist acts. The Road Map states that to "two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty willing." The Road Map's language calling for an "end to violence" is unequivocal.

Nonetheless, a number of news stories - almost as if their authors were tripping over themselves to speak for Hamas and will that organization into a position it has not adopted - and pundits have proclaimed that Hamas has now recognized Israel albeit implicitly. Hamas can't speak for itself and it has most clearly. Hamas minister Abdel Rahman Zeidan declared, "You will not find one word in the document clearly stating the recognition of Israel as a state." Nobody has agreed to this. This was not on the table. "This was not in the dialogue." Hamas legislator Salah al - Bardaweel stated, "We said we accept a state [in captured territory] in 1967 - but we did not say we accept two states." On the website, that organization's leading Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri stated that the agreement "doesn't violate any" of Hamas' "constants and principles."

The Hamas Charter lays out those "constants and principles" in unambiguous language. It declares, "The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day." It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. "Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that." Furthermore, it states, "Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement." "Abusing any part of Palestine is abuse directed against part of religion."

At last word, Hamas has given no indication that it plans to alter its Charter. Instead, its spokesmen have dismissed any notions that Hamas has explicitly or implicitly recognized Israel. In the end, if one wants to determine Hamas' intent, judge Hamas by its actions, not the "transference" of reporters' wishful thinking. The key "tests" that will be determined by Hamas' intentions are the following:

or Did Hamas publicly and explicitly recognize Israel's legitimacy and right to exist?

or Did Hamas confirm or post such recognition on its Website?

or Did Hamas modify its Charter to reflect its new position?

or Did Hamas announce plans to cease violence and dismantle its armed elements?

Until then, one should be wary of accepting to "false spring" of to recognition of Israel by Hamas that has not occurred. In the end, while agreement on the prisoners' document might constitute to consensus among Palestinian factions, it most definitely does not meet the minimal criteria set forth by the International Community.

Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.

They can now Fatah and Hamas agree?

Is it possible that peace in the Middle East can be achieved when two fanctions within the Palestinian Authority are in disagreement? This week Hamas and Fatah received invitations from Cairo "Kiss and make up".

Egyptian sources said that the delegations of Hamas and Fatah have been in discussions recently in Cairo to try to find a way can work together and form an interim Government of the Palestinian Authority and set a date for elections. According to 'O Arutz Sheva' (national news of Israel) a reconciliation agreement was announced on Wednesday and on Thursday sent invitations to Hamas and Fatah to sign it. It remains to be seen if this initiative can succeed in the Palestinian media that it has been widely reported in recent months 'troop' Hamas opposed reconciliation with Fatah.

Words of Jesus from Mark 3: 25 'If a House is divided against itself the home cannot survive' seems very apt in this situation. How West thinks that the Palestinian Authority can negotiate with Israel when it is not accepted within his own political arena? Do you want to reach an agreement with Israel? Clearly not everyone they otherwise could be firing rockets and sit down to negotiate the peace process. Israel is waiting to speak.

All the problems we have seen in recent months in the Arab world and the fact that suicide bombers Muslims kill Muslims rather than any other destination suggested that the House of Islam is very divided against itself. The terrible behaviour of some Islamic States of the East against its own citizens probably carried each civilized person thanks to God that in the State of Israel the world has a political, democratic and humanitarian presence in the Middle East. And rather than a State whose values are more akin to Western Nations than any other in that region - witness of what we have seen in Libya and Syria late, abductions and beheadings in Iraq a few years ago.

"Benefactors" in the West that are constantly trying to destabilize Israel with their campaigns of boycott and divestment would do well to reflect on these facts, if the Middle East loses Israel will be much more politically unstable than it is now. I think that the Arab world will be in peace once Israel has gone? Not a chance. A house divided against itself can not survive!

Russell Bowles
http://www.Israel-issues.com
Contact - russellbowles@hotmail.com

Hamas and the peace process

The recent Israeli attack on a suspected convoy carrying 10,000 tons of aid to the Palestinian people is not something that can be seen through a microscope. It is not an incident occurring in isolation. This incident should be interpreted taking into account the overall volatile atmosphere in the Middle East. Israel had blocked the cost of sea in 2007 when Hamas had won power in Palestine. The rise to power of Hamas has led to the intensification of attacks with rockets against Israeli settlements.

To understand the psyche of the Israeli attack, it is essential to have a glimpse of what the leaders of Hamas and its main protagonist, the President of Iran have been singing over the years. These leaders have been breathing fire in what they term ' Zionist expansionism "and calling for the destruction of the State of Israel." I wonder if people can remember that Israel was created by UN mandate after the end of World War II and the vast pogrom by the Nazis resulted in 6 million Jews still gassing to death. It was a form of atonement for the horrors inflicted on Jews during World War II.

However, Hamas has not accepted this and has repeatedly given a call for the destruction of Israel. Terrorist attacks and rockets are a word like test and cancel a mandate from the UN. Again the shipment of 10,000 tons of aid, is only a Red Bull cloth as the Israelis already permit 15000 tonnes of aid each week to enter Gaza.

The question is not really help, but the fact that Hamas and the radical Islamic movements are hell bent to destroy Israel. Human rights activists are extremely short sighted and eventually this talk of the convoy to break the cordon of Israel is not a favourable offer to establish peace in the region. The application of Israel to allow the convoy passes should be considered in the context of settlements of Israel rocket attacks. There are 600 activists mainly Turkish is a sad commentary on a country that professes to be secular. One really wonders how Turkey became involved in all this.

All signs point to the fact that Israel would not be leaving the fleet pass. After all it must appreciate that no nation can afford to rocket attacks by an opponent and still allow supplies pass. It is not a question of the functions of the United Nations in a way. Perhaps it would have been a good idea where the Turks who have instigated this convoy had called. But the impact echo widely and the Middle East peace process will no doubt suffer a new set.